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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1992). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has Highland City waived immunity under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989), waiving governmental immunity for any injury 
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, or street, when the injury occurs on a privately 
owned road in the public use containing a defective intersection 
which the municipality negligently designed? 
2. If Highland City has not waived immunity under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), has Highland City waived immunity under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) because Highland City employees 
negligently designed the intersection in the scope of their 
employment? 
3. Did the Plaintiff's injuries arise out of the 
negligent design of the intersection or did the Plaintiff's 
injuries arise out of the approval of the plat containing the 
negligently designed intersection? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is identical for all 
issues. In deciding whether judgment as a matter of law was proper, 
the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of 
the law. Rather, the appellate court reviews it for correctness. 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989) ; Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.
 f 
752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1982). In reviewing a summary judgment, the party against whom the 
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts 
presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in a light most favorable to it. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Garfield County. 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989)1 provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
1
 A revision of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989) was enacted 
in 1989 with an effective date of July 1, 1990. This accident 
occurred on January 18, 1990. Thus, the statute in effect on the 
date of the accident is provided. 
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* * * 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
* * * 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries she 
suffered in an automobile collision at the intersection of 6000 
West and 11500 North (the "Intersection") in Highland City on 
January 18, 1990. The Intersection was constructed in the early 
1980's in connection with the development of the Oakview PUD 
subdivision in Highland City, Utah County. The Plaintiff lived in 
the Oakview PUD at the time of the accident. 
Originally, the developer of the Oakview PUD designed 
11500 North, the PUD access road, to run straight along the 
northern boundary of the Oakview PUD property line, where it would 
eventually intersect with 6000 West, the county road. However, the 
Highland City Planning Commission refused to approve the Oakview 
PUD until the developer agreed to move a portion of 11500 North to 
the south such that the PUD's common area would be separated from 
the residential lots. However, under this arrangement, 11500 North 
intersected with 6000 West approximately 141 feet closer to the 
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crest of a hill on 6000 West. (See plat submitted by developer, 
attached as Exhibit "A", and plat as approved by Highland City, 
attached as Exhibit "B"). As a result, the ability of motorists 
entering the Intersection from either 6000 West or 11500 North to 
see other motorists was, and is, perilously limited. In fact, the 
Intersection was so close to the crest of the hill on 6000 West 
that it violated the safety standards for the construction of 
intersections which are set forth by the American Association of 
State Highway and Transportation Officials in their publication "A 
Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets." The 
publication is uniformly accepted by all traffic engineers in the 
State of Utah, including Defendant's experts, as the authoritative 
treatise on road construction safety standards. 
On January 18, 1990, the Plaintiff approached the 
Intersection in her vehicle. The Plaintiff looked both ways before 
entering the Intersection. However, due to the limited sight 
distance, Plaintiff was unable to see a vehicle being driven by 
Ryan Boley because the vehicle was still climbing the hill on 6000 
West. Believing it safe to enter the Intersection, the Plaintiff 
attempted to enter the Intersection. Upon entering the 
Intersection, Plaintiff's vehicle was struck and she was rendered 
a paraplegic. 
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B. Course of Proceedings, 
On March 12, 1992, Highland City filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) (1989) because it merely approved the 
plat submitted by the developer. R.347. Highland City also 
contended that it owed Plaintiff no duty because 11500 North was a 
private road. R.347. 
In her memorandum in opposition, the Plaintiff contended 
that Highland City could be held liable for her injuries because 
the city waived immunity for injuries caused by the defective, 
unsafe, and dangerous condition of a road, street or highway. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989). R. 597. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
contended that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) controlled this 
litigation and that this waiver was not modified by the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (c) (1989), which Highland City 
relied on in its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 597. 
The Plaintiff also argued that Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-
10(1)(c) (1989), reserving governmental immunity for the negligent 
approval or denial of any permit, did not apply because Highland 
City rejected the plat as originally submitted and directed or 
ordered the developer to move the road to the dangerous location 
before his plat would be approved. R. 597. Highland City did more 
than merely approve the location of the road. Rather, Highland 
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City directed and designed the location of the road. Thus, 
Plaintiff argued Highland City was liable not for approving the 
plat containing the dangerous and unsafe Intersection, but for 
negligently designing the Intersection in the first instance. R. 
597. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The trial court, by a Ruling dated June 3, 1992, granted 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) (1989) effectively shielded Highland City 
from liability. R. 382. The Court thus held that Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-8 (1989), relating to the defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of highways and roads, would not apply. R. 382. The Court 
also ruled that Highland City had no duty to place signs at the 
Intersection or otherwise maintain the Intersection because it did 
not own either road. (6000 West was a Utah County road and 11500 
North, which provided access to the county road for the residents 
of the Oakview PUD, was a private road). 
By an Order dated August 26, 1992, the trial court 
certified the summary judgment in favor of Highland City as a final 
order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
R. 687. A Notice of Appeal was filed on September 8, 1992. R. 693. 
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VIII. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff was involved in an automobile 
accident on January 18, 1990, at the intersection of 6000 West and 
11500 North (the "Intersection"), in Highland City, Utah County, 
State of Utah. R. 165. 
2. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a 
paraplegic. R. 347. 
3. 11500 North provides access to the Oakview 
Planned Unit Development ("PUD") . R. 486 (Deposition of Paul 
Frampton, Ex. 1) . The Oakview PUD was developed in the early 1980's 
and contains eight lots. R. 347. 
4. Plaintiff's family moved to the Oakview PUD in 
1986. The family lived in the Oakview PUD continuously until 
sometime after the accident on January 18, 1990. R. 347. 
5. Paul Frampton was the developer of the Oakview 
PUD. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 5-6). 
6. In developing the Oakview PUD, Mr. Frampton 
hired Richard Clayton to assist him in obtaining approval for the 
subdivision from the Highland City Planning Commission. Mr. Clayton 
had previously developed and obtained approval for another Planned 
Unit Development located immediately to the west of the Oakview PUD 
7 
in Highland City. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 6-7) R. 
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 6-7). 
7. Before a developer can commence construction of 
a Planned Unit Development in Highland City, the developer must 
submit a proposed plat of the development to the Highland City 
Planning Commission for consideration and approval. R. 353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 10). 
8. Mr. Clayton hired Nature's Estates Engineering 
to prepare a plat for the Oakview PUD and to submit that plat to 
the Highland City Planning Commission for consideration. R.353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 11). 
9. After the proposed plat for the Oakview PUD had 
been completed by Nature's Estates Engineering, it was submitted 
to, but rejected by, the Highland City Planning Commission. R. 353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 12) ; R. 486 (Deposition of Paul 
Frampton, pp. 11-13). 
10. In the original plat of the Oakview PUD 
prepared by Nature's Estates Engineering, 11500 North was designed 
as a straight road which ran east along the northern boundary of 
the Oakview PUD property line until it intersected with 6000 West. 
R. 597 (Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit 
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"A" of this Brief); R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 11-
12); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 12-13). 
11. Mr. Clayton and Mr. Frampton were notified by 
the Highland City Planning Commission that before the City would 
approve the Oakview PUD plat, Mr. Frampton would have to move part 
of 11500 North to the south so that the common area in the PUD 
would be separated from the lots by 11500 North. R. 486 (Deposition 
of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13) ; R. 353 (Deposition of Richard 
Clayton, pp. 14-15). 
12. In accordance with the conditions set forth by 
the Highland City Planning Commission, the Oakview PUD plat finally 
accepted by Highland City shows that 11500 North curves to the 
south and cuts through the property such that the common area is 
separated from the home lots. 11500 North intersects with 6000 West 
approximately 141 feet south of where it was originally planned to 
intersect. R. 597 (Exhibit "B" of Plaintifffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached 
as Exhibit "B" to this Brief) ; R. 486 (Deposition of Paul 
Frampton, pp. 11-12); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 
12-13). 
13. The Intersection designed by Highland City is 
defective, unsafe, and dangerous because the gradient on 6000 West 
as it approaches the Intersection is excessive. The Intersection is 
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also dangerous because southbound vehicles on 6000 West and 
motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North do not have 
adequate sight distance to perceive and react to each other. 
Motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North cannot see 
vehicles approaching the Intersection on 6000 West until the 
vehicle is only 285 feet away. C. Arthur Geurts, a licensed traffic 
engineer in the State of Utah, testified by affidavit as follows: 
7. Specifically, when Highland City required 
the developer (Paul Frampton) to move the 
Intersection from where it was proposed on the 
original plat approximately 141 feet to the 
south as a condition precedent to approval of 
the Oakview plat, the following AASHTO design 
standards were violated: 
a. Approach Gradient: For intersections like the 
one positioned at 6000 West and 11500 North, AASHTO 
specifies that the maximum approach gradient is 6 
percent. Therefore, because Oakview Drive has an 
approach gradient of at least 7 1/2 percent, the 
Intersection violates AASHTO approach gradient 
standards;2 and 
2
 "When the approach gradient of an intersection is greater 
than that specified by AASHTO, the required sight distance for the 
intersection must be increased because the excessive gradient 
negatively effects the acceleration capabilities of vehicles 
entering the Intersection and such vehicles require more time to 
enter the intersection and cross the through lanes of traffic. 
Based on my observations of the land 141 feet to the north of the 
Intersection (where the original Oakview PUD plat proposed the 
Intersection be located), if Highland City had approved the 
original Oakview PUD plat as submitted by the developer (Paul 
Frampton) and his engineers (Nature's Estates), there would have, 
in all probability, been no violation of the AASHTO approach 
gradient standards." 
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b. Sight Distance: Based on the 85th percentile 
speed of vehicles traveling on 6000 West and the 
excessive approach gradients at the Intersection, 
AASHTO specifies that the Intersection in question 
should have a sight distance in excess of 500 feet. 
Therefore, because the sight distance at the 
Intersection is only 265 feet, the Intersection 
violates AASHTO sight standards. 
8. Based on the results of my traffic study 
and the specific violations of the AASHTO 
standards enumerated above, it is my opinion 
that the Intersection is defective, unsafe and 
dangerous and that the specified deficiencies 
were a real and proximate cause of the subject 
accident. 
R. 597 (Exhibit "C" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
14. Officer Kerry Evans, the officer from the Utah 
County Sheriff's office who investigated the accident, stated in 
his Accident Report that: 
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly 
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic 
and the west bound traffic cannot see each other until 
the No[orth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill. The 
absence of skid marks of both vehicles in this accident 
shows this. 
R. 597 (Exhibit "D" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
15. On January 18, 1990, the Plaintiff approached 
the Intersection and stopped. R. 347. The Plaintiff looked both 
ways. She then entered the Intersection. The Plaintiff was hit by 
a north bound vehicle approaching the Intersection on 6000 West 
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immediately after she entered the Intersection from 11500 North in 
an attempt to turn south onto 6000 West. R. 597 (Exhibit "E" of 
Plaintifffs Memorandum in Opposition to Highland City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
16. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a 
paraplegic. R. 347 (Highland City's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. This matter requires statutory construction. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that "the fundamental consideration in 
interpreting statutes is legislative intent; and that is determined 
in light of the purpose the statute was designed to achieve." Board 
of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 
1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). Applying these principles, Highland City 
has waived immunity against the allegations in the Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint. 
II• A. Highland City has waived immunity, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989), from allegations that it negligently designed the 
Intersection. Highland City created a defective, unsafe, and 
dangerous condition in that motorists entering the Intersection 
from 11500 North are unable to see motorists entering the 
Intersection on 6000 West in time to avoid a collision. 
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It is beyond dispute that a person may maintain an action 
against a governmental entity for injuries which are proximately 
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a public 
road. Biaelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road Commission. 
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). However, 11500 North is a private road 
which is in the public use. The issue is whether there is any 
distinction in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) between governmental 
negligence in relation to a public road and negligence in relation 
to a private road. 
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the purpose of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), as reflected in the statute's plain 
language, is to provide relief to all motorists for governmental 
negligence in relation to roads and streets, without respect to 
whether the road is publicly owned or privately owned but in the 
public use. Plaintiff asserts that no distinction between public 
and private roads should be made absent a showing by Highland City 
that such was the intent of the Legislature. 
The definition of "highway" in the Motor Vehicle Act 
supports this conclusion. "Highway" is defined as any place which 
"is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for 
vehicular traffic." Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102 (1988). The 
definition of "highway" does not focus on the ownership of the 
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road, but instead focuses on whether the street is open to public 
use. The purpose of this broad definition of "highway" seems to be 
to protect all motorists, whether using a public or private 
roadway. 11500 North is open to public use. There is no reason to 
believe that the Legislature intended to expose those using private 
roads to governmental negligence while offering relief to those 
injured on negligently designed private roads. 
II.B. If Highland City has waived immunity under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), then the city may not recover that 
immunity if an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) 
also applies. Instead, where both the exception and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989) apply, the governmental entity is deemed to have 
waived immunity. Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 745 
(Utah 1971); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R., 749 P.2d 
660, 667 n.6 (Utah App. 1988); Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). The trial court erred by failing 
to consider whether Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) applied after 
it determined that an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-10(1) 
(1989) also applied. 
III. Highland City has waived immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10(1) (1989), which provides that governmental entities have 
waived immunity for all negligent acts committed by their employees 
within the scope of employment. Here, the Plaintiff has alleged 
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that Highland City employees negligently designed the Intersection 
while in the scope of their employment. The Plaintiff also 
presented unchallenged evidence demonstrating that Highland City 
designed the Intersection in a defective, unsafe, and dangerous 
manner. Thus, Highland City has waived immunity against the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. 
IV. The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained immunity 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) (1989), providing immunity 
for the negligent issuance of a permit, because Highland City 
merely approved the subdivision plat. This was error because in 
order for this provision to apply, the Plaintiff's injuries must 
"arise out of" the approval of the plat map. However, the 
Plaintiff's injuries here did not arise out of Highland City's 
negligent approval of the plat map, but arose out of Highland 
City's negligent design of the Intersection. 
Plaintiff asserts that Highland City should not be 
allowed to absolve itself and its employees of liability for their 
negligence by the issuance of a self-serving approval or permit. 
Instead, in accordance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Highland City should be held accountable for the negligent acts of 
its employees committed within the scope of their employment. 
Highland City has unfairly characterized Plaintiff's 
claims in order to retain immunity. The Utah Supreme Court has 
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indicated that municipalities should not be allowed to characterize 
the facts in such a manner that the case is pigeon holed into a 
category of activity for which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt 
Lake City. 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) ("the city may not rely on 
section 63-30-10(1) (d) of the Act to torture the facts of this case 
into the provisions of that section."). Plaintiff respectfully 
asserts that whether immunity exists should be based on the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and the facts 
established at trial and should not be based on Highland City's 
self-serving characterizations of the Plaintiff's claim. 
V. The trial court ruled that Highland City's activities with 
respect to the Intersection were normal activities of a 
municipality with respect to a subdivision, and therefore immunity 
should attach. However, no authority was given for this conclusion. 
The contention is contrary to the legislative purpose of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Legislature expressly waived 
immunity for the negligent acts of employees. The Legislature also 
waived immunity for governmental negligence in relation to both 
public and private roads. Thus, while Highland City's activities 
may have been normal, this does not, and should not, lead to the 
conclusion that the city is immune for negligently carrying out the 
activities. This is particularly true when there is no dispute that 
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had Highland City engaged in these activities in relation to a 
public road, immunity would have been waived. 
X. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
OVERVIEW 
The fundamental issue in this case is: Should a 
municipality have the authority to alter the plat design created by 
an engineer without using reasonable care to ensure that the 
changes to the plat are safe? The Oakview PUD plat was engineered 
by Nature's Estates Engineering, an experienced subdivision 
planner. The Intersection was located such that there was adequate 
sight distance for motorists of both 6000 West and 11500 North. Had 
Highland City approved the plat as engineered, the accident would 
likely not have occurred. 
But Highland City altered the Nature's Estates 
Engineering plan. The City, without re-engineering the Intersection 
to ensure that The City's plan was safe, required the developer to 
move the Intersection closer to the crest of the hill, causing the 
perilous sight distance problem. The issues are thus posed: What 
are the limits of a municipality's power to condition subdivision 
approval? Must the municipality use reasonable care to ensure that 
any conditions or alterations to the subdivision plat are safe? 
17 
Must the municipality either rely on the developer's engineering 
plan or, if it chooses to alter these plans, use reasonable care to 
ensure that the access road from the subdivision to the county road 
is safe? 
In order to appreciate the nature of this case, an 
analogy is in order using Loveland v. Orem City Corp. , 746 P.2d 763 
(Utah 1987). In Loveland, the developer failed to fence a canal. 
The City approved the plat without requiring the canal to be 
fenced. After the plaintiffs1 son drowned in the canal, the 
plaintiffs sued Orem City for failure to require the canal to be 
fenced. The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that Orem City could 
not be sued because it simply approved the plat plan submitted and 
relied upon the engineering of the developer to ensure that the 
development covered by the plat was safe. 
But assume a different set of facts. Assume that the 
developer, after extensive engineering, submitted a plat with the 
canal fenced. Assume further that the Orem City Council, without 
using due care to ensure that the canal would still be safe, would 
not approve the plat with the canal fenced because it wanted access 
to the canal. Orem City would then have replaced a safe 
improvement with an unsafe improvement. Orem City also would fail 
to apply the standard of reasonable care which would be required if 
the canal was publicly owned. 
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A similar situation happened here in the case at bar. 
Highland City altered the safe and engineered location of the 
Intersection and moved the Intersection, without using reasonable 
care, to an unsafe location. Highland city failed to meet the 
standard of care which would be required if 11500 North was a 
public road. 11500 North was the access road which the public 
would use to access 6000 West, the county road. 
This entire case focuses on whether a municipality should 
have the power to place subdivision residents at peril without 
using due care to ensure that the municipality!s subdivision plans 
are safe. Plaintiff's approach is simply this. If the municipality 
wishes to rely upon the developer's plans and engineering to assume 
that reasonable care was used in designing the subdivision, then no 
liability should attach to the municipality. But if the 
municipality chooses to disregard the developer's engineering and 
replace it with its own plans, then it must use due care in doing 
so. This is consistent with the this Court's recent decision in 
Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992), where 
the Court stated: 
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality 
to erect traffic control devices, the common 
law requires only that once the municipality 
takes action to install such devices, it must 
do so in a non-negligent manner. 
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Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not seek to alter the 
power of municipalities with respect to subdivisions. Plaintiff 
only asks that the municipality either rely on the engineering of 
the developer, or use due care in redesigning the plat. Highland 
City did neither here. Plaintiff only asks that Highland City use 
the same reasonable care in redesigning subdivision plats and roads 
contained therein which the law requires that it must use in 
designing public roads and improvements. 
The arguments below focus on legal reasoning and 
statutory interpretation. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this 
Court view these arguments in light of the above policy arguments. 
A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This matter requires statutory interpretation. The issue 
is whether Highland City has retained immunity from suit against 
allegations that employees of Highland City negligently designed 
the Intersection in an inherently defective, unsafe, and dangerous 
manner. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "primary 
responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature." American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 
P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984); West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah 1982) . The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that "the 
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fundamental consideration in interpreting statutes is legislative 
intent; and that is determined in light of the purpose the statute 
was designed to achieve." Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. 
Salt Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). 
The Plaintiff respectfully asserts that applying these 
standards, Highland City has waived immunity for the negligent 
design of the Intersection. 
B. 
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR 
DEFECTIVE, UNSAFE. AND DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN 
ROADS AND STREETS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, § 63-
30-8 (1989), 
1. UTAH CODE ANN, S 63-30-8 (1989) APPLIES WHERE THE GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITY NEGLIGENTLY DESIGNS A PRIVATELY OWNED ROAD WITHIN THE PUBLIC 
USE, 
Highland City has waived immunity, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) , from allegations that it negligently 
designed the Intersection. Highland City created a defective, 
unsafe, and dangerous condition in that motorists entering the 
Intersection from 11500 North are unable to see motorists entering 
the Intersection on 6000 West in time to avoid a collision. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located thereon. 
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Id. The trial court, without discussing the merits of this 
provision, held that it would not be applicable because Highland 
City had retained immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1)(C) (1989). 
As demonstrated below, there can be little doubt that 
Highland City has waived immunity when its negligent acts create a 
defective, unsafe, and dangerous condition in a public highway or 
road. However, 11500 North is a private road owned and maintained 
by the Oakview PUD, although 11500 North is within the public use. 
There is no Utah authority on the issue of whether Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989) applies to negligent governmental acts in relation 
to private roads in the public use. Thus, the goal is to determine 
the legislative intent, which is to be evaluated in light of the 
purpose of the statute. Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. 
Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). 
It is beyond dispute that a person may maintain an action 
against a governmental entity for injuries which are proximately 
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a public 
road. Bigelow v. Incrersoll, 618 P. 2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road Commission, 
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). In Bigelow, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the state negligently designed the traffic control lights at an 
intersection, causing both lights at the intersection to be green 
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at the same time. The Utah Supreme Court held that the design and 
installation of traffic control devices was not a "discretionary 
function" for which immunity had been retained. Id. at 53. Instead, 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) applied and, 
therefore, the state was not immune from suit. Id. at 53-54. 
In Andrus v. State. 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the "State created a dangerous condition 
by its design of the highway project" and that the conduct was 
within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9 (1989), waiving 
immunity for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous 
condition in any public building or structure. Id. at 1120. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's contention that its design 
was a discretionary function, holding that "the preparing of plans 
and specifications and the supervision of the manner in which the 
work was carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions." 
Id. Once again, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed against the 
governmental entity. 
Finally, in Carroll v. State Road Commission. 496 P. 2d 
888 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that the creation of 
a highway design which used "berms" instead of signs to protect 
motorists was not a discretionary function. Id. at 891. Instead, 
the Court held that the State was not immune from suit for its 
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negligent design of the highway and the plaintiffs could bring 
suit. Id. 
These cases demonstrate that had 11500 North been a 
public roadway, Highland City would not have immunity under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) against allegations 
that it negligently designed the Intersection. The Legislature's 
clearly expressed intent was to waive immunity for any defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition caused by government in the design 
and maintenance of highways and roads. The issue becomes whether 
Highland City has also waived immunity when the governmental 
conduct occurred in relation to a private road in the public use. 
Put another way, is there any basis for distinguishing between the 
negligent design of a public road as opposed to the negligent 
design of a private road within the public use for purposes of 
immunity. Plaintiff respectfully asserts the legislative intent 
would not allow for such a distinction. 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the legislative 
intent is the plain language of the statute itself. The statute 
applies to "any highway, road, [or] street", without distinguishing 
between public roads and privately owned roads in the public use. 
The broad language of the statute suggests that the Legislature 
intended to waive immunity for all governmental involvement in 
relation to highways, roads, and streets. The statute indicates 
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that anytime a governmental entity becomes involved in the design, 
construction, or maintenance of any highway, road, or street, the 
entity has waived immunity from allegations of negligence 
regardless of whether the highway, road, or street was publicly 
owned or privately owned but in the public use. 
It is well accepted that in construing statutes, the 
Court must assume that each term of the statute was used advisedly. 
For example, in Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake 
City, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
This Court assumes that the terms of a statute 
are used advisedly and should be given an 
interpretation and application which is in 
accord with their usually accepted meanings. 
Id. See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 
1971)("Foundational rules require that we assumed that each term of 
the statute was used advisedly.11). 
Applying this principle, this Court should assume that 
the Legislature intended no distinction between injuries occurring 
on a public road and those occurring on a privately owned road in 
the public use. No such distinction should be created absent a 
showing by Highland City that the Legislature intended to allow 
governmental entities to negligently design privately owned roads 
without being subject to liability. 
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Highland City will no doubt argue that the Legislature 
intended the statute to apply to roads which the government 
controlled and maintained. However, the purpose behind Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) is to provide relief to those who have been 
injured on a road or street due to the negligence of government in 
the design or maintenance of the roads. If the Legislature failed 
to waive immunity, motorists would have no remedy for a defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition on a road because government is 
responsible for maintaining and designing the roads. There is no 
one else to provide relief when the government negligently designs 
a road because only the government was negligent. 
The same situation is present here. The developer will 
argue that Highland City designed the Intersection and, therefore, 
he cannot be held liable. Highland City argues that it is immune 
and, therefore, cannot be held liable for designing the 
Intersection. Thus, the Plaintiff is left without a remedy, even 
though the Legislature has expressly waived immunity in order to 
insure that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy for their injuries. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the purpose of the statute was 
to hold governmental entities liable for their negligent acts in 
relation to roads and streets, without respect to whether or not 
the road was publicly owned or privately owned but in the public 
use. 
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There is additional support for this contention in the 
definition of "highway" in the Motor Vehicle Act. (The term 
"highway" is not defined in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.) 
"Highway" is defined in the Motor Vehicle Act as follows: 
(8) "Highway" means the entire width between 
property lines of every way or place of any 
nature when any part of it is open to the use 
of the public, as a matter of right, for 
vehicular traffic. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102 (1988). The same definition is provided 
in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1(14)(1988). This definition of "highway" 
is broad, encompassing both public and private roads, and indeed 
covers any "way" open for use by the public. The definition of 
"highway" does not focus upon ownership of the road, but instead 
focuses on whether or not the public will use the highway. While 
the Oakview PUD retains responsibility for maintenance of 11500 
North, the street is accessible by anyone and is, therefore, "open 
to the use of the public". 
The broad definition of "highway" contained in the Motor 
Vehicle Act is apparently designed to protect users of all highways 
open to public use, whether or not these highways are publicly or 
privately owned. Under this definition of "highway", one could be 
held liable for traffic violations, such as speeding or running a 
stop sign, on both 6000 West, a public road, and 11500 North, a 
private road within the public use. With its broad definition of 
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"highway", the legislature subjected both public and private roads 
to the same safety regulations in order to protect the users of 
these streets and highways. Indeed, in many instances, such as the 
present one, there is no way to determine without a visit to the 
county building whether one is travelling on a publicly owned road, 
for which recovery can be had against the government for its 
negligence, or a privately owned road used by the public, for which 
Highland City argues no recovery for governmental negligence can be 
obtained. 
There is no reason to believe that the Legislature, in 
enacting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), intended to depart from 
its purpose of protecting all users of both public and private 
highways from governmental negligence. There is also no evidence 
that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy for only those 
users injured while operating motor vehicles on a public highway, 
even where the governmental entity negligently designed the private 
highway within the public use. Instead, the more reasonable 
interpretation is that the Legislature intended to protect all 
motorists using highways in the state from governmental negligence, 
without respect to whether or not these "highways" are public or 
privately owned, and intended to provide the same remedy for 
governmental negligence whether the negligence occurred in relation 
to a public or private road. 
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In sum, there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-8 
(1989) which suggests that immunity is retained when the 
governmental entity acts negligently with respect to a privately 
owned road in the public use. The broad wording of the statute and 
the apparent purpose of the statute both suggest that the remedy 
should be the same regardless of whether the government negligently 
designs a public road or a private road in the public use. In both 
instances, the negligent act is the same, the injuries are the 
same, and the public sought to be protected is the same. Only the 
name on the title differs. 
Thus, the Plaintiff respectfully submits that because the 
statute makes no distinction between public and private roads, this 
Court should not create one absent a showing by Highland City that 
the Legislature intended to shield governmental entities from their 
negligence simply because the title to the road was privately held. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(O (1989) IS SUBJECT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63-30-8 (1989). 
The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained 
immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) 
(1989), and therefore refused to consider whether Highland City had 
waived immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1989) . This ruling proceeds from the assumption that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 (c) (1) (1989) is not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-8 (1989) . But Utah law consistently holds that if both Utah Code 
29 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) and an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1) (1989) apply, the governmental entity is held to have waived 
immunity. 
For example, in Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 
741 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 9 
encompasses a much broader field of tort 
liability that merely negligent conduct of 
employees within the scope of their 
employment, the legislature could not have 
intended than Sec. 10, including its 
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even 
though it be conceded that the negligent 
conduct of an employee might be involved in an 
action for injuries caused by the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous or defective 
condition. 
Id. at 745 (emphasis added) . 
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. , 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah App. 1988), this Court noted that: 
In his cross-appeal, Gleave did not challenge 
the trial court's dismissal of UDOT. Rio 
Grande, in both its opposition to UDOT's pre-
trial motion to dismiss and in its appeal to 
this court, has not contended that Gleave's 
injury was caused by UDOT's creation of a 
dangerous condition on a road, for which 
immunity is expressly waived in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1986). This separate waiver 
provision is not subject to the "discretionary 
function" exception in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-
10(1). [citations omitted]. 
Id. at 667 n.6 (emphasis added) . See also Provo City Corp. v. State 
of Utah, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). 
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Thus, Utah law in this area is clear. If Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989) applies to this matter, then Highland City has 
waived immunity, even if it is found that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(c) (1989) also applies. 
C. 
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR THE 
NEGLIGENT DESIGN OF THE INTERSECTION UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1) (1989). 
Even if Highland City did not waive immunity under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), it has waived immunity against the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989), which provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
* * * 
Id. 
Plaintiff has alleged that Highland City employees, 
acting within the scope of their employment, negligently designed 
the Intersection, thereby creating a defective, unsafe, and 
dangerous condition which was the proximate cause of the 
Plaintiff's injuries. As such, Highland City has waived immunity 
from suit. 
The trial court did not consider this provision because 
it found that an exception to this provision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
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30-10(1)(c) (1989), applied and therefore Highland City retained 
immunity. However, as detailed in Section IV of this Appellant's 
Brief immediately below, the exception is not applicable because 
the injuries did not "arise out of" the approval of the subdivision 
plat, but instead arose out of the negligent design of the 
Intersection by Highland City. In fact, none of the exceptions to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) apply in this matter. Highland 
City has, therefore, waived immunity against the allegations in the 
Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 
summary judgment entered in favor of Highland City be reversed. 
D. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (1) (O (1989) DOES 
NOT APPLY TO SHIELD HIGHLAND CITY FROM 
LIABILITY BECAUSE THE INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT 
OF THE APPROVAL OF THE SUBDIVISION PLAT. 
The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained 
immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c) 
(1989), which provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
* * * 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, and permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(c)(1989). 
In order for the trial court to make this ruling, the 
court had to find that the Plaintiff's injuries "arose out of" the 
approval of the subdivision plat. Id. The trial court erred in its 
ruling because there was no evidence to this effect. Instead, all 
evidence leads to the conclusion that the proximate cause of the 
Plaintiff's injuries was Highland City's negligent design of the 
Intersection. The allegations in the Plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint support this contention: 
21. City of Highland had a duty to design, 
construct, sign and maintain the intersection 
in a manner which would provide individuals 
approaching or entering the intersection with 
a reasonable opportunity to see approaching 
traffic and act accordingly. 
23. The intersection was negligently designed, 
constructed, signed, and/or maintained by City 
of Highland and its employees, agents or 
contractors because motorists approaching the 
intersection from the South and East do not 
have a reasonable opportunity to either see 
each other as they approach and enter the 
intersection or take necessary evasive action. 
R. 165 (Second Amended Complaint, f 21, 23) (emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Plaintiff presented credible evidence 
establishing that Highland City negligently designed the 
Intersection. The developer of the Oakview PUD, Paul Frampton, 
testified that Highland City "didn't want the common area to be 
contiguous with any of the lots. They wanted it separate from the 
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lots, so that it would be an entity in and of itself." R. 486 
(Deposition of Paul Frampton, p. 13). Richard Clayton, who 
submitted the original plat, testified that Highland City "is the 
one that designed the common area. And as I recall, they made that 
a stipulation before the approval of the subdivision." R. 353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 15). 
Plaintiff is not attempting to hold Highland City liable 
for merely approving the subdivision plat without removing the 
dangerous Intersection. Rather, Plaintiff is attempting to hold 
Highland City liable for negligently designing the Intersection and 
requiring that 11500 North be positioned in such a manner that the 
Intersection is defective, unsafe, and dangerous. 
The crux of Highland City's argument seems to be that so 
long as the final act of government is the approval of the plat 
map, all negligent acts of employees committed within the scope of 
their employment are not actionable because immunity is retained. 
In other words, once the permit is issued or approval is given, all 
employees are absolved of their negligence and injured victims are 
left without a remedy. Under Highland City's argument, 
municipalities are free to act negligently and are then allowed to 
absolve themselves of liability by issuance of a self-serving 
approval or permit. 
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Granting Highland City immunity does not reflect the 
purpose of the Legislature in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) 
(1989). The Utah Legislature expressly provided that negligent acts 
committed by governmental employee within the scope of their 
employment are actionable if they are the proximate cause of the 
accident. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989). The Legislature 
intended to provide relief for individuals injured by the negligent 
acts of governmental employees. By allowing municipalities to 
circumvent this intended purpose by issuance of a self-serving 
permit or approval, this purpose is defeated. Municipalities can 
shield themselves from providing that which the Legislature has 
given—relief to individuals injured by negligent acts of 
governmental employees. 
Before the trial court, Highland City unfairly 
characterized the Plaintiff's contentions in order to pigeon hole 
the Plaintiff's claim into a category of activity for which 
immunity has been retained. Plaintiff respectfully asserts that 
whether governmental immunity exists should be based on the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and evidence which is 
adduced at trial, not on the self-serving characterizations of 
Highland City. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that municipalities 
should not be allowed to characterize the facts in such a manner 
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that the case is pigeon holed into a category of activity for which 
immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P. 2d 126 (Utah 
1987). In Ingram, plaintiff fell through a defective water meter 
lid. Plaintiff alleged that Salt Lake City negligently designed the 
placement of the water meter lid, for which there was no immunity. 
Salt Lake City argued that its true failing was to inspect the 
water meter lid after it had been installed, for which immunity had 
been retained. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (d) (1989) . The Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Salt Lake City attempts to distinguish Murray 
and Bowen on the grounds that in the former, 
the plaintiff fell into a hole on the sidewalk 
and in the latter, the city's maintenance of a 
city street was at issue, whereas here the 
vault was not located on a public street. Both 
status and case law hold otherwise, and the 
city may not rely on section 63-30-10(1) (d) of 
the Act to torture the facts of this case into 
the provisions of that section. 
Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
Like Ingram. Highland City here argues that its true 
failing was to negligently approve the subdivision plat, even 
though there is no evidence that this failing proximately caused 
the Plaintiff's injuries. Highland City seeks to avoid the issue of 
whether it negligently designed the Intersection by torturing the 
facts in order to retain immunity under one of the waiver 
exceptions. 
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Absolutely all the evidence in this case indicates that 
the Plaintiff's injuries "arose out of" the negligent design of the 
Intersection. Thus, there is no provision under which Highland City 
has retained immunity, and the summary judgment in favor of 
Highland City should be reversed. 
Before the trial court, Highland City placed great 
reliance upon Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P. 2d 763 (Utah 
1987). For this reason, Plaintiff discusses Loveland in her brief. 
In Loveland, the Orem City Council approved a plat without 
requiring the developer to fence a canal running behind the 
subdivision. The plaintiffs1 son drowned in the canal. The 
plaintiffs claimed that Orem City was negligent in the "review and 
approval of the plat by the Orem City Council." Id. at 775. The 
Orem City Council did not alter the developer's plans with respect 
to the plat. Instead, the Orem City Council relied upon the 
developer to insure that the subdivision was safe and properly 
designed. 
Here, Highland City went well beyond mere "review and 
approval" of a plat designed by others. Highland City did not rely 
upon the developer to insure that the subdivision was safe. 
Instead, Highland City designed the Intersection and, therefore, 
accepted the duty to design the Intersection in a reasonable 
manner. The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated the general rule 
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as once a municipality undertakes a duty to design or maintain a 
road, it must exercise due care. Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 P. 2d 
554 (Utah 1992). In Jones, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality 
to erect traffic control devices, the common 
law requires only that once the municipality 
takes action to install such devices, it must 
do so in a non-negligent manner. 
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The difference between Loveland and 
the instant case is that in Loveland, the Orem City Council did not 
accept this duty because it merely approved the developer's plans. 
Here, Highland City chose to design the Intersection rather than 
rely upon the developer. 
Thus, Loveland and the instant case are qualitatively 
different. In Loveland, all the claims related to the "review and 
approval of plat B of Executive Estates." Loveland, 746 P. 2d at 
775. Here, any claims regarding the approval of the plat are 
distinct from the primary allegation that Highland City negligently 
designed the Intersection. Thus, Loveland does not control this 
matter. 
Highland City also relied upon Bennett v. Bow Valley 
Development Corp.. 797 P. 2d 419 (Utah 1990), before the trial 
court. Like Loveland, the Plaintiff's in Bow attacked "the 
inspection and acceptance of subdivision improvements which were 
never completed." Id. at 423. In Bow, there was no contention that 
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the City was negligent apart from the approval of the subdivision 
plat. 
In both Loveland and Bow, the plaintiff was attempting to 
hold the municipality liable for failing to prevent the negligence 
of third parties. In neither case was the municipality the party 
that had acted negligently. Plaintiff has no quarrel with either 
Loveland or Bow, or the notion that a municipality cannot be held 
liable simply because it fails to "catch" the negligence of third 
parties. But Plaintiff does quarrel with the notion that the 
principles stated in Loveland and Bow would shield a municipality 
from the negligence of its own employees where no third party is 
involved. 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(1) (1989) focuses on what the injury "arises out of". 
Here, there can be little dispute that the injury arose out of the 
design of the Intersection, not the approval of the subdivision 
plat. Here, there is no dispute that no one other than Highland 
City designed the intersection. As such, Highland City has waived 
immunity for it negligent design of the Intersection. 
E. 
HIGHLAND CITY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACT 
NEGLIGENTLY WITH RESPECT TO SUBDIVISION 
DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT WAIVER OF IMMUNITY 
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In the closing paragraph of the trial court's ruling, the 
court held: 
Furthermore, Utah case law supports 
defendant's position that the granting of 
immunity in this case is consistent with the 
need for a municipal government to participate 
in and have a say in development, without 
incurring liability therefrom. 
R. 382. This statement was made without supporting authority, and 
is contrary to the principles of governmental immunity in this 
state. 
As outlined above, there can be no doubt the Legislature 
waived immunity for the negligent design of a public intersection. 
The Legislature apparently intended to provide relief to those 
injured by a governmental entity's negligent design. This leads the 
Plaintiff to ask: Why would the Legislature waive immunity for the 
negligent design of a road or street, but then except from that 
waiver the negligent design of a subdivision intersection? Why 
would the Legislature allow municipalities the freedom to 
negligently design roads in private subdivisions which would 
provide access to public roads when it would not allow 
municipalities to negligently design public roads without 
accountability? Highland City attempts to create a distinction 
between public intersections and private intersections, but there 
is no rational basis for making such a distinction. To create such 
a distinction destroys the purpose of the Utah Governmental 
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Immunity Act, which is to provide relief to those injured by the 
negligent acts of government. 
Perhaps there is some merit to the trial court's 
contention that municipalities must have some freedom to 
participate in subdivision design. But that freedom should be 
subject to the same conditions as are imposed when government 
participates in other activities, such as the design of a public 
road. Just as the State waives immunity once its decides to design 
a public highway or road, it should be held that Highland City has 
waived immunity when it chooses to participate in the subdivision 
design. This contention has particular merit since Highland City 
was under no duty to participate in the design of the Intersection. 
In sum, Highland City should be held accountable for its 
actions. Without any legal requirement to do so, Highland City 
chose to design this Intersection. Therefore, it accepted the duty 
to design the Intersection in a safe manner. Jones v. Bountiful 
City, 834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992). Highland City failed in 
this endeavor. Thus, it should be required to pay the price for its 
negligence. 
XI. 
CONCLUSION 
Highland City has waived immunity for creating a 
defective, unsafe, and dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-8 (1989) . However, even if this provision does not apply, 
Highland City has still waived immunity because its employees 
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negligently designed the Intersection while acting in the scope of 
their employment. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989). The 
exception to this waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-
10(1) (c) (1989) does not apply because the approval of the plat was 
not the proximate cause of the injury. Instead, the injury was 
proximately caused by Highland City's negligent design. On the 
basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Highland City, and remand these proceedings to the trial 
court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this A£ day of January, 1993. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Randall D. Lund 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
January, 1993, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, first class to the following: 
Gary B. Ferguson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Highland City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Lee C. Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Utah County 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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